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RECENT CASES
Aerial Law-Invitee Killed by Airplane Landing at Airport-The
plaintiff's son was riding his bicycle on a roadway, formerly a public thorough-
fare, that transected the flying field, after a contest sponsored by defendant de-
partment store was over but while an air circus was still in progress. Both events
were advertised in a newspaper and the public was invited. The defendant air-
plane owner, who knew of the presence of several thousand people in and about
the airport, struck and killed the plaintiff's son in landing his airplane. There
was testimony that the defendant airplane owner could have avoided the blind
spot caused by his airplane, which he said was the reason for his not seeing the
decedent, by the standard, although not required,' practice of "fishtailing". 2 The
lower court directed verdicts in favor of the defendant airplane owner and the
defendant airport company. Plaintiff contends that the case should have been
submitted to the jury as to the liability of the defendant airplane owner on the
grounds of negligence and of absolute liability imposed by statute,' and as to the
liability of the defendant airport company, on the ground of negligence. Held
(three judges dissenting), that the section of the statute imposing absolute liabil-
ity on owners of aircraft, when construed in connection with the preceding sec-
tion,4 does not apply to authorized landings at airports, but that the question as
to the liability of both airplane owner and airport company on the ground of
negligence was a matter for the jury.5  State, to Use of Birckhead v. Sammon,
189 At. 265 (Md. 1936) .6
There is a conflict among the authorities as to the theory on which liability
is to be imposed upon airplane owners for injuries to persons or property on
land. Some writers subscribe to the doctrine that the general rules of negligence
should apply; 7 others take the view that absolute liability should be imposed; 8
whereas still another group favors absolute liability, subject to the defense of vis
majore.9 The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics adopted the view of absolute
I. The Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 568 (1926), 49 U. S. C. A. § i7i et seq.
(Supp. 1936) says nothing of "fishtailing" in the landing of airplanes.
2. "Fishtailing" is the practice of tilting the airplane from one side to the other to
eliminate the blind spot caused by either the fuselage or the wings of the airplane. Instant
case at 268.
3. ANN. CODE MD. (Flack, Supp. i935) art. I A, § 5 which reads: "(Damage on Land.)
The owner of every aircraft . . . is absolutely liable for injuries . . . caused by the
ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft . . . whether such owner was negligent or not,
unless the injury was caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured,
or the owner or bailee of the property injured."
4. ANN. CODE MD. (Flack, Supp. 1935) art. I A, §4 which reads: "(Lawfulness of
Flight.) Flight in aircraft . . . is lawful, unless at such low altitude as to interfere with
the existing use to which the land or water, or space over the land or water is put by the
owner. . . . For damages caused by a forced landing, however, the owner or lessee of the
aircraft or the aeronaut shall be liable, as provided in Section 5."
5. The judgment of non prosequitur as to the defendant owner and lessor of the air-
port, and the judgment upon the directed verdict in favor of the defendant department store,
both of which were affirmed, are not herein discussed.
6. Released for publication Jan. 14, i937.
7. HoTctKiss, AVIATION LAw (1928) 39-43; 3 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE
(6th ed. 1913) § 653 (f) ; Newman, Damage Liability In Aircraft Cases (1929) 29 COL. L.
REV. 1039.
8. EAzETINE, THE LAW OF THE Am (i9II) 86; LOGAN, ArRcRATr LAW-MA E PLAIN
(1928) 53; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (i934) § i65; Baldwin, Liability For Accidents in Aerial
Navigation (igio) 9 MICH. L. REV. 20; Bogert, Problems in Aviation Law (1921) 6 CORN.
L. Q. 271.
9. ZOLLmAN, LAW OF THE AIR (1927) c. III; McCracken, Air Law (923) 57 A.m. L.
REV. 97.
(635)
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liability with contributory negligence as the only defense.10 But all these theories
were meant to refer only to those situations where the descent of the aircraft that
caused the injury would be a trespass to the landowner." Therefore, the court
in the instant case quite properly refused to apply the absolute liability statute.
But this does not preclude holding the airplane owner liable by the common law
rules of negligence, which would seem to require the pilot, under the circum-
stances of this case, to exercise a greater amount of care than he usually did.' -
Nor can it be said that the decedent, even in attending an airport, 3 voluntarily
assumed the risk of the negligent operation of airplanes.' 4 Moreover, the airport
company certainly owed a duty to invitees to use care to keep the field free from
the dangers of ordinary use of the airport,15 and failure to take the available pre-
cautions of policing or erecting signs and barriers was clearly negligence.'6 Nor
does the fact that the injury was directly caused by the airplane owner relieve
the airport company of liability; the landing of an airplane was clearly foresee-
able, and the fact that the plane was negligently operated should make no dif-
ference.' 7 It is submitted that the court, in properly analyzing the problems
involved, made a valuable contribution to the development of the adolescent field
of aircraft law.
Agency-Liability of Principal for Negligence of Purchaser Driving
Agent's Car on Demonstration-The defendant automobile sales agency
required its salesmen to own their own cars and made no objection to the sales-
men's allowing prospective purchasers to drive the cars as a means of demon-
stration. During such a demonstration, while the salesman was in the front seat,
the customer negligently drove the car into the plaintiff. Held, that the auto-
mobile company is liable since the salesman was acting within the scope of his
employment in allowing the customer to drive the car, and also because the cus-
tomer was the company's subagent. Smith v. Howard Crumley & Co., 171 So.
189 (La. App. 1936).
The first of the two grounds on which the court bases its decision is tenable
only if one resorts to the fiction of constructive identity of the agent and the
driver,' for the principal's liability is predicated on acts of the agent, 2 and in this
io. The Maryland statute in the instant case is the adoption, in toto, of the Uniform
State Law for Aeronautics. 9 UNIF. LAws ANN. (1932) 14.
ii. This conclusion is drawn from an examination of the authorities cited supra notes 7,
8 and 9.
12. Greunke v. North Am. Airways Co., 203 Wis. 565, 23o N. W. 618 (ig3o) (air-
plane landing on airport crashed into airplane on runway).
13. It is sometimes said that one attending an airport assumes the ordinary risks
necessarily attendant upon air flight. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1935)
§523, which states that air flight is an ultrahazardous activity; Bohlen, Aviation Under the
Common Law (1934) 48 HAzv. L. REv. 216, reprinted in (1934) 6 AIR L. REv. 155. Contra:
Newman, Damage Liability In Aircraft Cases (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 1039, at 3O48: "It is
the writer's belief that this nebulous doctrine will not be applicable in cases of aircraft
damage except perhaps in the event of injury to pilots or passengers knowingly engaged in
experimental or test flying."
14. See Bohlen, supra note 33, 48 HARV. L. REV. at 222.
15. Logan, The Liability of Airport Proprietors (193o) i J. AIR L. 263, at 268-9.
16. Platt v. Erie County Agric. Soc., 164 App. Div. 99, 149 N. Y. Supp. 52o (4th Dep't,
1914) ; Smith v. Cumberland Agric. Soc., 163 N. C. 346, 79 S. E. 632 (913) ; Richmond
& M. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 94 Va. 493, 27 S. E. 70 (1897). In all these cases, as in the instant
case, there was no trespass, but no statute imposing absolute liability was involved.
17. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 447.
I. 7 LABATT, MASTER & SERVANT (1913) 7739; 2 MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914)'
§ 1867; Note (1926) 44 A. L. R. 1382, 1385. Labatt criticizes the theory not only as being
unsatisfactory but also as resting on cases which either have been overruled or were de-
cided on other points.
2. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §:2,9 (I).
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case there is no intimation of any negligence in the agent's allowing the prospec-
tive purchaser to drive. On the other hand, the second of the court's grounds
turns on questions of fact which seem greatly stretched when examined in refer-
ence to the accepted principle of law that an agent is one who acts in behalf of
and under the control of the principal.3 There is little doubt that the salesman
had the implied authority to permit the customer to drive because of the long
acquiescence to this custom on the part of the dealer.4 But, in determining the
presence of the first element, the argument that the prospective customer, in
trying out the car to satisfy himself as to its performance, was acting in behalf of
the sales company, appears far-fetched when their fundamentally antagonistic
interests as buyer and seller are considered.5 However, the second, and more
important, element of control 1 of the driver by the company may be found if it
be assumed that the sales company had the right to control the salesman, and
that the salesman had the right to control the driver. However, in the light of
the existing facts that the sales company gave the salesman broad discretionary
powers to negotiate the sale, and that the salesman owned the car,7 the right of
control of the company over the salesman's driving appears quite tenuous.8
Assignments-Validity of Assignment of a Cause of Action Based
upon Fraud-Plaintiff's amended statement of claim alleged, inter alia, that
the defendant was surety on a bond, executed pursuant to law 1 in order to enable
X to deal in securities; that X, through misrepresentations, effected a contract of
sale with the plaintiff's assignors, who paid the purchase price thereon; and that
the contract was rescinded prior to an assignment of the cause of action arising
therefrom to the plaintiff. In a suit on the bond, the defendant's demurrer was
sustained. Held, that the assignment was valid since it carried with it a property
right independent of the right to sue for fraud, and that therefore the demurrer
should have been overruled.2 Mayer v. Rankin, 63 P. (2d) 6ii (Utah, 1936).
At common law, a right of action in tort was not assignable.3 This rule
obtained because such a transfer was regarded as the passing of an interest not
as yet in esse. For this reason it was considered that to permit an assignee to
litigate a fraud practiced upon the assignor would be contrary to public policy.4
3. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § i; HUDDY, AUTOMOBILE LAW (9th ed. 193) § 138.
4. i MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 244.
5. Bertrand v. Mutual Motor Co., 38 S. W. (2d) 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
6. McCarthy v. Souther, 83 N. H. 29, 137 Atl. 445 (1927).
7. This situation should be distinguished from cases where the dealer owned the car,
thus giving him the right of control over any authorized driver. In these cases the dealer
has been held liable. Hoffman v. Roehl, 6i Mont. 290, 203 Pac. 349 (i921), 2o A. L. R.
i89 (1922) ; HUDDY, op. cit. supra note 3, § o5.
8. Cf. Goff-Kirby Coal Co. v. Aquila, 29 Ohio App. 345, 162 N. E. 748 (1928).
i. UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (933) tit. 82, c. .1, § i5.
2. The court felt unquestionably bound by precedent; for, as stated in the opinion, Law-
lor v. Jennings, 18 Utah 35, 55 Pac. 6o (1898) held that an action for money paid by mis-
take is assignable, and White v. Texas Co., 59 Utah I8O, 202 Pac. 826 (1921) held, inter
alia, that an assignee of a stockholder, fraudulently induced to part with his shares, could
maintain an action for the return thereof.
3. Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 418, 184 Pac. 477 (1919) ; Marsh v. Western N. Y.
& Pac. Ry., 204 Pa. 229, 53 Atl. iooI (9o3) ; Manganiello v. Lewis, 122 Pa. Super. 435,
i86 AtI. 2x8 (936).
4. Swallow v. Tungsten Products Co., 205 Cal. 207, 270 Pac. 366 (1928) ; American
Woolen Co. v. Old Colony Trust Co., 263 Mass. 321, 16o N. E. 816 (928); Grabow v.
Bergeth, 59 N. D. 214, 229 N. W. 282 (930) ; Killen v. State Bank, io6 Wis. 546, 82 N. W.
536 (i9oo).
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Subsequently, inroads were made upon this rule so that, although causes of action
for injuries of a personal nature remained non-assignable, nevertheless causes of
action for those injuries, even though personal, which lessened the estate of a
party and which were thus connected with a property right, became transferable. 5
Accordingly, the theory of the court in the instant case was that since the contract
of sale, effected through fraud, was rescinded prior to the assignment, such
rescission left to the contract vendees a property right in that they were entitled
to recover the purchase price paid by them on the contract, and it was this prop-
erty right which was assigned to the plaintiff.6 But however sanctioned by prece-
dent,7 this inroad made upon the old common law rule restricting assignability
seems unwarranted; for, inasmuch as the defendant's conduct also gave rise to a
clear and assignable cause of action in contract for money had and received,8 the
application of the court's theory would appear to be entirely unnecessary. More-
over, since the reasoning of the instant court would be applicable to all cases of
fraud, the alleged "inroad" in effect completely abrogates the original common
law rule. It is therefore submitted that the court should either have expressly
changed the old common law rule, or else should have adhered to it, requiring
the plaintiff to sound his action in contract. The adoption, as in this case, of a
middle ground, founded upon the somewhat illusory conception of a "property
right" connected with a tort claim, adds neither to the certainty nor to the clarity
of the law.
Civil-Procedure-Non-conclusiveness of Sheriff's Return on Non-resi-
dent-The sheriff's return of a summons in assumpsit recited that service
had been made upon an adult member of the defendant's household at his Penn-
sylvania residence. The defendant petitioned the court to strike off the return on
the ground that he was a non-resident of Pennsylvania and had no household in
that state. Held, that a sheriff's return, full and complete on its face, is not con-
clusive upon a non-resident. Vaughn v. Love, 324 Pa. 276, 188 Atl. 299 (1936).
It is well settled that compliance with the due process clause requires a court
to have jurisdiction over a defendant in order to render a valid judgment against
him in personam.1 Lack of jurisdiction not only results in a judgment which is
not entitled to full faith and credit, but in one which is void in the state of rendi-
tion. 2 And such jurisdiction is not acquired over a non-resident unless he is
personally served within the confines of the forum I or in a manner prescribed
by statute.4 However, the instant case, in rightfully holding that a sheriff's return
is open to attack on jurisdictional grounds,5 departed from the frequently enun-
ciated Pennsylvania rule, that in the absence of fraud, a sheriff's return, full and
5. MacLeod v. Stelle, 43 Idaho 64, 249 Pac. 254 (1926) ; Wines v. Rio Grande Western
Ry., 9 Utah 228, 33 Pac. lo42 (1893) ; Day v. Buckingham, 87 Wis. 215, 58 N. W. 254
(1894).
6. Instant case at 616, 617.
7. See supra notes 2, 5.
8. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) §412, p. 1179; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) § 161.
1. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (877).
2. River Side & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189 (1915); Baker v.
Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917) ; GOoDRI cH, CONFLICT OF LAws (1927) § 70.
3. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877). An exception to this rule is exemplified
by statutes empowering the secretary of the state to accept service for a non-resident who
injures another while driving an automobile within the state. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S.
352 (1926) ; Aversa v. Aubry, 303 Pa. 139, 154 Atl. 311 (931).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 296 et seq.
5. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 77, comment a.
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complete on its face, is conclusive upon the parties., Whereas this rule has been
applied only to residents,7 there seems no logical basis for distinguishing the case
of a resident from that of a non-resident. Moreover, it is submitted that in
neither case should a sheriff's return by its own force be permitted to confer
jurisdiction upon a court, when in fact there has been no personal service or
compliance with a substituted service statute.8 Various methods of service have
been provided by the Pennsylvania Practice Act,9 and whether there has been
compliance with the statute is a question of fact. In deciding this question of
fact, although there may properly be a rebuttable presumption in favor of proper
service,' 0 it is submitted that the sheriff's return should not, in view of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, be conclusive either upon resi-
dents or non-residents."
Constitutional Law-Validity of State Tax on Public Utilities for Ex-
pense of Regulation and Inspection-Burden of Proof-The State of Wash-
ington levied a tax of one-tenth of one per cent of the gross operating revenue of
certain utilities to pay the cost of regulation and inspection. The plaintiff rail-
road sought to recover payments, on the ground that the proceeds of the tax
exceeded the amounts expended for supervision and regulation since they were
appropriated to a department having other functions, and thus the tax was uncon-
stitutional as a burden on interstate commerce, and as a denial of due process of
law and of equal protection of the laws. Held (four justices dissenting), that
although the measure did not on its face indicate a failure to adjust the tax to the
expense of regulation and supervision, the burden was on the state to prove that
the proceeds were spent solely for those legitimate purposes, and the state failed
to sustain this burden; therefore the Act was unconstitutional. Great Northern
Ry. v. Washington, U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 6Io.
It is well settled that a state may, in the exercise of its police power, tax
public utilities for the purpose of paying the cost of supervising and regulating
them." The tax involved in the instant case 2 purported to be levied for this
6. Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Sickler, 97 Pa. Super. 152 (1929) (service on an
adult member of the family at the dwelling-house) ; Rittenberg v. Stein & Specht, 97 Pa.
Super. 554 (193o) (person in charge of defendant's place of business); Prestendren v.
Conaboy, 14 D. & C. 1O2 (Pa. 1929) (constable's return; adult member of the family);
Weist v. Heffernan, 17 D. & C. 212 (Pa. 1931) (defendant's agent signed registry receipt
at last known address).
The merit in the rule of conclusiveness is that a default judgment would have a pre-
carious existence if the service of the writ could be attacked years later. Instant case at
280, 188 Atl. at 3O.
7. Park Bros. & Co. v. Oil City Boiler Works, 204 Pa. 453, 54 At. 334 (1902) ; Key-
stone Telephone Co. v. Diggs, 69 Pa. Super. 299 (918); Seminole B. & L. Ass'n v.
Levit, 107 Pa. Super. 252, 163 Atl. 345 (933); Wood v. Industrial H., A. & L. Ins. Co.,
107 Pa. Super. 338, 163 Atl. 391 (933).
8. The remedy given one injured by a false return against the sheriff should have no
bearing on the question of due process. Rittenberg v. Stein & Specht, 97 Pa. Super. 554
(930).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § 291.
IO. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (1873) § 124.
ii. Conclusive presumptions of fact have been held violative of the due process clause
in other fields. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926); State Tax Comm. v.
Robinson's Ex'r, 234 Ky. 415, 28 S. W. (2d) 491 (1930).
In a number of states the legislature has by statute expressly abolished the common
law rule by declaring the sheriff's return to be prima facie evidence of facts therein stated,
and in others by authorizing it to be traversed. See Sunderland, The Sheriff's Returm (1916)
16 COL. L. REv. 281.
i. Charlotte, C. & A. R. R. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386 (1892) ; Atlantic & Pacific Tele-
graph Co. v. Philadelphia, 19o U. S. 16o (1903).
2. WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1933) §§ 10417, 10418.
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legitimate purpose.3  The usual rule is that a legislative measure fair on its face
is presumed to be constitutional until it is clearly proved otherwise, and that the
burden of proof is on the taxpayer to show that it is unconstitutional in its actual
operation.4 However, in the instant case, the court, relying on Foote & Co. v.
Maryland;' said that the burden of producing certain evidence was on the state.
That case involved a tax whose proceeds could properly be used only for inspec-
tion, whereas the statute clearly indicated that the proceeds were also to be used
to pay for other functions performed by the department having charge of inspec-
tion, and the Court held that the burden was on the state to show that in fact the
cost of inspection equaled the amount raised by the tax. The instant case involved
a taxing measure which did not on its face indicate an unconstitutional purpose
or establish a prima facie case for the contesting taxpayer. But the Court found,
contrary to the opinion of the dissenting justices 6 and the ruling of the Supreme
Court of Washington, 7 that the plaintiff had proved enough to raise a presumption
against the validity of the statute,s not by the terms of the tax itself, but by proof
as to the use of the proceeds, and that the burden of proof had thus shifted to the
statef The plaintiff had proved that the department to which the proceeds of the
tax were paid performed other functions than supervision and regulation of rail-
roads and that it did not indicate in its records and accounts how much was spent
for each function. In view of the fact that the state was the only party who could
produce the data concerning allocation of expenditure of the proceeds of the tax,10
it was proper that the state should have the burden of going forward with the
evidence to explain this matter." But it is submitted that to shift the burden of
proof to the state, as the Court purported to do, and thus to require it to sustain
the validity of the tax by a preponderance of the evidence, would favor the indi-
vidual taxpayer disproportionately as against the state legislature. However, the
Court did not distinguish between burden of proof and burden of going forward
with the evidence, nor was such a distinction necessary, since the state had sus-
tained neither burden. It is therefore probable that the Court did not mean
wholly to abrogate the general rule that the burden of proof is on the party con-
testing the validity of the measure,' 2 but intended merely to give the plaintiff the
3. See Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 172 Wash. 649, 656, 21 P. (2d) 721, 723
(933), aff'd on other questions, 291 U. S. 300 (1934).
4- Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); Interstate Busses
Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U. S. 245 (1927), 23 ILL. L. REv. 4oi (1928) ; Gregg Dyeing Co.
v. Query, 286 U. S. 472 (1932) ; Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 403
(936), 34 Micn. L. REv. 1263; Norfolk & Western Ry. v. North Carolina, 297 U. S. 682
(1936).
5. 232 U. S. 494 (1914).
6. See instant case at 613.
7. See Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 184 Wash. 648, 657, 52 P. (2d) 1274, 1277
(1935).
8. Foote & Co. v. Maryland, 232 U. S. 494, 5o6 (914), stands for the proposition that
a presumption of invalidity of a tax arises from proof of intermingling the functions to which
the proceeds could properly be allocated with those to which they could not.
9. See 5 WIGmoRE, EVwDENcE (2d ed., 1923) §2489.
io. See instant case at 61o. But see the dissenting opinion at 613 (expressing the view
that the plaintiff had not exhausted all opportunities to discover the exact relationship be-
tween income from railroads and proper expenditures for them). The report of the case
seems to indicate that $37,833.14 more than was collected from railroads was spent for
them. But this information was of little value to the taxpayer because an undetermined
part of the money spent for railroads went for rate hearings and reparation proceedings for
which the railroads could not be required to pay.
ii. See Great Northern Ry. v. Washington, 184 Wash. 648, 657, 52 P. (2d) 1274, 1277
(1935) to the effect that difficulty of proof does not shift the burden. This is a valid prop-
osition, but in certain situations difficulty of proof may place on the defendant the burden
of going forward with the evidence. See 5 WIG oRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed., 1923) § 2486.
12. See cases cited supra note 4.
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benefit of a prima facie case in favor of unconstitutionality, thus requiring the
state to explain the method of expenditure in order to throw the case back to the
plaintiff on whom remained the burden of proof. 3
Corporate Reorganization-Provability of Claim for Damage for Loss
of Future Rent Against Lessee in 77B Proceedings-The trustee in bank-
ruptcy of the lessee rejected a lease which contained no covenant to indemnify
for loss of rent. The lessor's assignee relet the premises and, in subsequent 77B I
proceedings instituted by the bankrupt, filed a claim which was refused because
the re-entry by the lessor had terminated the leasehold. Held, reversed and
remanded, because 77B provides a provable claim for injury due to rejection,
although the lease has no covenant to indemnify,2 and despite termination of the
leasehold under state law by the lessor's conduct subsequent to rejection of the
lease. City Farmer's Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 292 (1937).
Despite a covenant to indemnify against all loss of future rent, the absolute
limitation on the allowance of such a claim to an amount not in excess of the suc-
ceeding three years' rental,3 where the difference, upon liquidation, between the
present rental value and the value of the rent reserved exceeds such amount, does
not violate the Fifth Amendment, and is within the power of Congress to fix the
equitable distribution of a debtor's assets. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 57 Sup.
Ct. 298 (1937).
Where a leasehold was abandoned or rent was in default a lessor, because of
the common law concept of rent as an obligation issuing from the land, was for-
merly obliged to delay suit until each installment fell due.4 Although bankruptcy
or equity receivership proceedings were regarded as an anticipatory breach of
ordinary executory contracts so as to create a provable claim in such proceed-
ings,5 this doctrine did not apply to leases, and claims for future rent, being con-
tingent, were generally held not provable and hence not discharged; 6 the lessor-
lessee relationship continued, and the lessor could claim only for past rent in the
proceedings,7 and could look only to an empty corporate shell or a depleted and
13. The Supreme Court handles res ipsa loquitur cases in this manner, shifting only the
burden of going forward with the evidence, and the situation in the instant case would
appear to be analogous. See Sweeney v. Irving, 228 U. S. 233 (1913) ; Note (1928) 53
A. L. R. 1494, 1511.
I. 48 STAT. 912 (1934), II U. S. C. A. §207 (1936).
2. "The claim of a landlord for injury resulting from the rejection of an unexpired
lease of real estate or for damages or indemnity under a covenant contained in such lease
shall be treated as a claim ranking on a parity with debts which would be provable under
Section 63 (a) of this Act. . . ." Section 77B (b) (io). (Italics added.)
3. "The claim of a landlord . . . for . . . indemnity under a covenant contained in
such lease . . . shall be limited to an amount not to exceed the rent, without acceleration,
reserved by said lease for the three years next succeeding the date of surrender of the
premises to the landlord or the date of re-entry of the landlord. . . 2 Section 77B (b) (io).
4. In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, igio); see Wm. Filene's Sons v,
Weed, 245 U. S. 597, 6o1 (1918).
5. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U. S. 581 (i916); Pennsyl-
vania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912); Schwabacher
and Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy (1933) 33 COL. L. Ray. 213, 239. See Coleman
v. Withoft, 195 Fed. 250, 253 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912).
6. Wells v. Twenty-first St. Realty Co., 12 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); In re
McAllister-Mohler Co., 46 F. (2d) 91 (S. D. Ohio, 1930) ; Urban Properties Inc. v. Irving
Trust Co,. 74 F. (2d) 654 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1021; 3 WI.LISTON,
CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 1327-1329, 1985.
7. In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, i91o) ; It re Sherwoods, 210 Fed.
754 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913); Notes (1934) 32 MIcH. L. Rav. 664, i8 MiNN. L. RE. 872.
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harassed individual debtor for further recovery." To protect himself against the
harshness of this situation, the lessor could, by inserting a covenant in the lease
permitting re-entry, recover possession of the premises, but this also terminated
liability for rent and the lessor thus lost the benefit of his bargain.9 Also, the
inclusion of covenants for indemnity for loss of rent were frequently ineffective,
since the damages occasioned by the termination of the lease were regarded as
speculative, contingent, and not "absolutely owing" at the time of the adjudica-
tion.' Although the Court had formerly recognized that mere contingency did
not per se render a claim non-provable,1 and that damages for loss of future rent
might be susceptible of liquidation under a method "fair and familiar", 12 it
required the legislative amendment to Section 63 (a) " and the express pro-
visions of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act 1-4 to assure a lessor any certainty
of recovery for such damages by rendering them a claim provable in bankruptcy
or corporate reorganization. The City Farmer's Trust Co. case 15 clarifies the
provisions of 77B by holding that, upon rejection of the lease, such a claim for
damages is provable whether or not the lease contained a covenant for indemnity.
This holding will deter voluntary petitions by corporations seeking to reorganize
in order to effect a revision of leases, and will afford relief to lessors who
formerly were left with nebulous claims which had survived bankruptcy. Fur-
thermore, in interpreting the Act, the Court in effect discarded the archaic and
illogical distinction between leases and other executory contracts, treating the
rejection of the lease as an anticipatory breach so far as to permit the provability
of the claim to remain undisturbed by the lessor's subsequent re-entry, despite
the fact that under most local law the re-entry would have destroyed the validity
of the claim.' 6 This construction is desirable, since, in the computation of
damages, the rent reserved is reduced by the amount of the present rental value,
which amount cannot in fact be realized unless there is a re-entry.
The limitation imposed on the measure of allowance, and the discharge of
the lessor's claim for any amount in excess of the value of the three year rentaly,
7
mark a wide departure from the bankruptcy rule that non-provable claims are not
discharged. However, in sustaining the constitutionality of this limitation, the
Court was impressed with the practical considerations of the speculative character
of such damage, and the reasonableness of substituting a certain, albeit limited,
remedy, for one which was uncertain and usually ineffective.:' That such a
limitation results in the impairment of contractual obligations presents no serious
8. See In re Portage Rubber Co., 296 Fed. 289, at 292 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Clark,
Foley and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Contracts and Leases by Receivers (1933) 46
HAxv. L. REv. i111.
9. Manhattan Properties, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320 (934), 83 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 530. In re Rite's Clothes, 49 F. (2d) 393 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); Douglas and Frank,
Landlord's Clains in Reorganizations (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1003.
io. Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224 (193o) ; Manhattan Properties Inc. v.
Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320 (1934) ; In re Ells, 98 Fed. 957 (D. Mass. i9oo) ; (1936)
84 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 543. But see Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, 293 U. S. 307 (934).
ii. Compare Maynard v. Elliot, 283 U. S. 273 (931) (executory contract) with
Atkins v. Wilcox, 105 Fed. 595 (C. C. A. 5th, I9OO) (lease).
12. Win. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597, at 6o2 (1918) ; Irving Trust Co.
v. Perry, 293 U. S. 307 (I934).
13. 48 STAT. 924 (I934), H U. S. C. A. § IO3 (a) (7) (claim limited to an amount
not in excess of one year rent reserved). See (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 543.
14. See supra notes i, 2, 3.
i5. City Fanner's Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 292 (,937).
i6. See Note (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. Iiii, at 1170. Cf. In re McAllister-Mohler Co.,
46 F. (2d) 91 (S. D. Ohio, 1930) ; Moore v. McDuffie, 71 F. (2d) 729 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
17. Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 298 (1937) ; Note (x936) 49 H.Av. L.
REV. IIII, at 1,72.
I8. 57 Sup. Ct. 298, at 3oi et seq. See Jacobson, Landlord's Claims Under Section 77B
of the Bankruptcy Act (1936) 45 Y A L. 3. 422.
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obstacle to the Court since all bankruptcy proceedings have a similar effect; nor
is such impairment forbidden by the constitution.:9 Although the application of
such an arbitrary rule will result in the recovery of damages in varying propor-
tions, the lessor in the Kuehner case who was allowed to claim one-half the differ-
ence between the present rental value and the present value of the rent reserved,
was not permitted to complain since this limitation was not regarded as unfair as
to one now allowed a claim which formerly was not provable.
Labor Law-Injunction to Force Striking Employees to Leave Their
Employer's Premises-The defendants, an organized group of the petitioner's
employees,' refused either to work at their jobs or to leave the petitioner's plants
until the petitioner acceded to certain demands. The petitioner, unable to operate
its plants, sought an injunction ordering the defendants to leave the premises.
Held (inter alia), that the injunction should be granted since the petitioner's
remedy at law is inadequate. General Motors Corp. v. International Union
United Automobile Workers of America, Mich. C. C., (1937) 4 U. S. L.
WEEK 678.
It is well settled that, although the employee is an occupier of the premises,
the immediate right to possession is in the employer, and that consequently the
employee becomes a trespasser upon failure to comply with the employer's request
to leave. 2 Since the legal relationship between the parties is so clearly defined,
the sole question for determination in a situation such as this is the adequacy of
the petitioner's legal remedy. Equity has long enjoined continuing or repeated
trespasses on the ground that since the petitioner may recover damages at law
only up to the time of trial, so that he would be required to sue an indefinite
number of times in order to obtain full compensation, his legal remedy is inade-
quate.4 This doctrine has been applied specifically to cases of a single employee
refusing to leave his employer's premises after discharge,5 even though the
employer's action is a breach of a term contract of employment." The instant
case presents an even stronger ground for equitable relief since the employer is
threatened with an irreparable injury by virtue of the fact that it is practically
impossible to determine accurately the damages to be recovered for loss of good
will and other commercial intangibles occasioned by the complete cessation of its
business due to the large number of refractory employees. 7 Undoubtedly, there
are extreme difficulties in the enforcement of such a decree as this, since the
tendency of the employees, when massed in a large group, is to resist the action
of the sheriff,8 yet it does not appear that, except for certain well-defined types
ig. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4; id. Amend. V. See Kiehner case at 301.
i. It was estimated that about goo employees had gone on strike. N. Y. Times, Feb. 2,
1937, P. I, col. 8.
2. Lane v. Au Sable Electric Co., 181 Mich. 26 (1914); Bowman v. Bradley, 151 Pa.
351, 24 Atl. 1062 (1892); Case v. Knight, 129 Wash. 570, 225 Pac. 645 (1924).
3. 5 Pomrmoy, EQUITY JuRispRuDExcE (4th ed. igig) § i9o8; Walsh, Equitable Relief
Against Trespass (1929) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. R-v. 56, 6o.
4. Cityco Realty Co. v. Slaysman, 16o Md. 357, 153 Atl. 278 (1931) ; Walsh, loc. cit.
supra note 3.
5. Marshall v. Matthews, 149 Ga. 370, oo S. E. 103 (1919); Landrum v. McMinds,
205 Mo. App. 66, 218 S. W. 899 (1920). But see Mechanics Foundry v. Ryall, 75 Cal. 6oi,
17 Pac. 703 (1888).
6. Mackenzie v. Minis, 132 Ga. 323, 63 S. E. 90o (19o9).
7. Zierath v. McCann, 20 Cal. App. 561, 129 Pac. 8o8 (191i2). See Trustees of First
Evangelical Church v. Walsh, 57 Ill. 363, 366 (187o).
8. N. Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1937, p. 1, col. 8.
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of cases,9 equity has ever considered the practical difficulties of enforcement as a
deterrent to its taking jurisdiction. Certainly, a recognition of the defendants'
physical power and a consideration of that power as a reason for refusal of relief
would be a clear acknowledgment of the uncivilized principle that "might makes
right", and thus would be contrary to the basic purpose of every existing legal
system.'0 The fact that the purpose of the strikers' action is the betterment of
their physical and financial condition has never been deemed sufficient to justify
outright tortious conduct."' Undoubtedly, the efforts of "labor" to improve its
position bear a strong emotional appeal and should be sufficient ground for the
condonation of many minor offenses against the more tenuous property rights,
but they should never be permitted to justify actual physical usurpation of private
property.
Negligence-Negligence of a Fellow Servant Imputed to Plaintiff En-
gaged in a "Joint Enterprise"-Plaintiff sought damages for her husband's
death which was caused by the negligence of the driver of the defendant's truck,
combined with the negligence of the decedent's fellow-servant who was driving
the truck in which the decedent was riding. The decedent and the driver, neither
of whom was foreman or superior to the other, nor had the exclusive duty of
driving the truck, were proceeding to a distant town in the course of their
employment.' Held, that the plaintiff could not recover because the decedent and
his fellow-employee were engaged in a joint enterprise, and the driver's negli-
gence was therefore imputed to the decedent. Lacey v. Heisey, 5 N. E. (2d) 699
(Ohio App. 1936).
A joint enterprise is generally defined as an undertaking with a common
purpose in which the parties concerned have a joint right to control the operation
of the vehicle.2 The cases indicate great diversity of opinion as to what factual
situations may be brought under this definition,' but it has been generally held
that fellow-servants are not participants in a joint enterprise since they are not
on a venture of their own but are merely carrying out their employer's purpose,
and also because they lack the joint right to control the conduct of each other in
the operation of the vehicle.4 The instant court, however, while recognizing the
above definition, and the authorities, to the effect that co-employees are not joint
enterprisers, attempted to distinguish the instant case on the ground that since
9. Contracts to form partnerships will not be enforced. Clark v. Truitt, 183 IIl. 239, 55
N. E. 683 (1899). Nor will the courts enforce contracts calling for the personal perform-
ance of artists. De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch. 264 (N. Y. 1833).
io. See N. Y. Herald Tribune, Feb. 27, 1937, p. I, col. I, for an account of the ousting
of a large body of "sit-down" strikers. As a last resort the militia might be used. See
Note, Use of Military Force in Domestic Disturbances (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 879.
ii. See Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 8I, 159 N. E. 863, 869
(1928); FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION (1930) 24.
I. Although the court mentioned the fact that the employees paid for gasoline and food
without reimbursement from their employer, it was not discussed in the opinion. Shar-
ing in the expenses is usually considered one factor, but not conclusive, in favor of finding
the existence of a joint enterprise. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (934) §491, comment g.
2. HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 148; Hawley, Joint Adventure (1933) 7 WASH. L. REv.
377; Notes (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REV. 676, (1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 401, (1929) 38 YALE
L. J. 81o.
3. See I BERRY, LAw OF AUTOMOBILES (6th ed. 1929) §§ 644-649.
4. Denver Tramway Co. v. Orbach, 64 Colo. 511, 172 Pac. lO63 (1918); Dameron v.
Yellowstone Trail Garage, 54 Idaho 646, 34 P. (2d) 417 (934) ; Stoker v. Tri-City Ry.,
182 Iowa 2O9O, 165 N. W. 30 (917) ; Skvarce v. Sales Necessities Inc., 267 Mich. 540, 255
N. W. 328 (934) ; Seiver v. Pittsburgh Ry., 252 Pa. 1, 97 Atl. 116 (1916) ; see RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS (934) § 491, comment d.
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these servants had the right to alternate in the driving of the truck, they therefore
had the right to control the conduct of each other in respect thereto. But the
mere right to alternate in the driving would not seem sufficient to give a co-
employee the right to control the driver's conduct in operating the vehicle.5 Also
the fact that fellow-servants are working for another rather indicates the absence
of a joint purpose of their own, since it is their employer's purpose that they are
undertaking to accomplish.6 Moreover, the joint right of control, which is the
generally accepted basis of the doctrine of joint enterprise, is at most a fiction;,
the simultaneous exercise of such a right would probably prove disastrous in the
operation of a vehicle. Therefore, the true basis for the imputation of negligence
in these cases is probably the fact that the parties are on a venture for their com-
mon advantage, and policy dictates that one should be bound by the acts of the
other during the consummation of their joint purpose.7 Where, as in this case,
the occupants of the vehicle are not on a common venture for their own purpose,
it is submitted that there is no policy in favor of extending the fiction of joint
control in order to apply the doctrine of joint enterprise.
Taxation-Validity of State Tax on Resident's Income from Land Out-
side the State-New York, under statutory authority,1 imposed an income
tax on rent received by the relator, a New York resident, from realty in New
Jersey. The relator sought a refund of the tax on the ground that the statute
violated the i 4 th Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Held (Justices Butler
and McReynolds dissenting), that since the tax was not imposed on property
outside the state, there was no violation of due process. 2 People ex rel. Cohn v.
Graves, U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 753.
Although the Supreme Court had previously upheld the state's power to tax
its residents' income earned outside the state,3 none of the cases involved a tax
5. In Kirkland v. Atchison T. & S. Ry., 104 Kan, 388, 79 Pac. 362 (gig), the plain-
tiff was instructing the driver as to the operation of a new milk route, and the court held
that the negligence of the driver was imputable to the plaintiff because he had an equal,
if not a superior, right to control the operation of the vehicle; but the court also found that
the plaintiff was himself contributorily negligent.
There seems to be no other case involving the imputation of negligence in which the
co-employees both had a right to drive.
6. See Note (2936) 2o MINx. L. REv. 401, 406, where it is suggested that a joint
enterprise must arise from a consensual relation between the parties, and therefore the fact
that co-employees do not voluntarily initiate such a relation when traveling together for
their employer is one reason why they are not on a joint enterprise.
7. See Hzr R, ToRTs (1933) § 148.
x. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 62 § 359.
2. The Court in the instant case also upheld New York's right to include in plaintiff's
taxable income the interest from bonds physically outside the state and secured by mort-
gages on land outside the state. Cf. Kirkland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (879) ; Sav-
ings and Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898) ; Bristol v. Washington
County, 177 U. S. 33 (1900).
3. Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U. S. 12 (1920) (tax by domiciliary state on income received
by resident beneficiary from securities held in trust outside the state held valid) ; Lawrence
v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276 (1932) (tax by domiciliary state on income de-
rived by resident from construction contracts performed outside the state held valid) ; cf.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 28o U. S. 83 (1929) (state of beneficiary's residence
has no jurisdiction to impose a property tax on the corpus of the trust estate, consisting of
intangibles held by trustee outside the state) ; Baltimore v. Gibbs, 166 Md. 364, 171 Atl. 37
(1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 559 (I934) (nor has it any jurisdiction to tax the beneficiary's
equitable interest in such a trust) ; see Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction Of Income for Tax
Purposes (ig3I) 44 HARV. L. REV. 1075; (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 148.
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on income from land beyond the state's jurisdiction. Confronted with its decision
in Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co.,4 the Court reasoned that that case
was not conclusive of the instant question, since it decided merely that an income
tax was a direct tax requiring apportionment,5 and not that it was a tax on the
property from which the income was derived. Furthermore, the Court found that
there are sufficient differences between a property and an income tax to justify
allowing the domiciliary state to tax the income, even though it had no jurisdic-
tion to tax the property which produced it." To support its decision the Court
resorted to the familiar argument, previously emphasized more in dissenting 7
than in majority opinions, that since the domiciliary state protects the recipient in
the enjoyment of his income, it is equitable that he contribute to the state for such
benefits. Conceding that there is legal and economic support for such a tax,
there still remains the question as to whether New Jersey, the state where the
property is located, may also tax the rent as income." If the benefit theory is to
be resorted to, it would seem that New Jersey has an equally valid right to tax,
the income, since it affords protection to the property which produces the income.
And in Shaffer v. Carter," the Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to tax
the income of non-residents derived from sources within the state. But this
decision was rendered before the recent cases in which the Court manifested its
hostility toward double taxation.' 0 Therefore, despite the tendency of the Court
to treat income taxes as sui generis,"1 its earlier statement that "the rule of immu-
nity from taxation by more than one state . . . is broader than the applications
thus far made of it" 12 would make it appear not unlikely that it will refuse to
allow double taxation of income,1 ' thus leaving the state in which the income is
earned to derive its sole compensation from taxation of the property itself.14
Trusts-Savings Deposit "In Trust" Creating Tentative Trust Not
Testamentary in Character-Decedent opened a savings account in her name
"in trust for Josephine Matour". The first paragraph of decedent's will expressly
revoked all prior "wills, testaments, or writings in the nature thereof". The
guardian of two minor legatees sought to surcharge the executrix with the amount
of the savings deposit. Held, that the deposit created a tentative trust which was
not testamentary in character and which therefore was not revoked by decedent's
will. In re Pozzuto's Estate, 188 At!. 209 (Pa. Super. 1936).
4. 157 U. S. 429 (I895), aff'd on rehearing, 158 U. S. 6oi (1895).
5. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
6. See instant case at 754. The Court in the instant case distinguished Senior v. Braden,
295 U. S. 422 (1935), by stating that the tax there, though measured by income from land
outside the state, was technically a property tax. See (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 148, 149.
7. See dissenting opinions in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, at 95
(1929) ; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204, at 216 (930); Baldwin
v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, at 595 (1930) ; Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422, at 433 (935).
8. There was no evidence that New Jersey, in the instant case, taxed the same rent as
income.
9. 252 U. S. 37 (1920).
Io. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28o U. S. 204 (193o) ; Baldwin v. Mis-
souri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930) ; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U. S. I (1930) ;
First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932); cf. Commonwealth v. Madden's Ex'rs,
97 S. W. (2d) 561 (Ky. 1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 427 (I937).
ii. See Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax (1933) 17 MINN. L. REv. 127, 145.
12. First Nat. Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 326 (1932).
13. For cases involving double taxation of intangibles see (937) 85 U. OF PA, L. REv.
428, n. 9.
14. Cf. People ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, U. S. Sup. Ct., (937) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 514.
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The instant case shows clearly that the doctrine of tentative trusts, an inten-
tion to adopt which was indicated in Scanlon's Estate,' noted in a former issue of
the RZsvinw,2 has now become a part of Pennsylvania law. Although the doctrine
has been criticized as judicial legislation 3 and is obviously a fiction evolved to
solve a specific problem,' little reason has been advanced for its invalidation.
5
And under the established conception of a tentative trust as a trust with an
implied power of revocation," the court was logical in its conclusion that the
tentative trust was not testamentary and therefore was not revoked by the revok-
ing clause in the decedent's will.
7
Trusts-Use of Trust Funds for Purchase of Corporate Stock-A trust
was created by will in an estate which included among its assets common and
preferred stocks of private corporations. The trustees were given power to
change investments at their discretion without confinement to "legal investments",
and specifically to retain any investments, to exercise any options to subscribe to
stocks which might be given them as holders of any securities, and to join any
reorganization plan of any corporation of which the estate might hold shares. On
granting a petition for a declaratory judgment, held (Stearne and Sinkler, JJ.,
dissenting 1), that the trustees might invest in common and preferred stocks of
private corporations. Carwithen's Estate, 28 D. & C. 66 (Pa. 1937).
I. 313 Pa. 424, 169 At. io6 (1933) (a specific disposal of the savings by will was held
to have revoked the trust). The doctrine is recognized in RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS (1935)
§ 58. The fact that the estate outside of the savings account does not seem to have been
sufficient to carry out the bequests fully is not considered by the court. In such a case the
account is treated as a part of the decedent's estate. RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS (1935) § 58(b);
cf. Matter of Murray, 143 Misc. 499, 256 N. Y. Supp. 815 (Surr. Ct. 1932), 42 YALE L. J,
141 (estate outside of deposit insufficient to pay specific legacies in full) ; Matter of Mannix,
147 Misc. 479, 264 N. Y. Supp. 24 (Surr. Ct. 1933) (will directed payment of debts, etc.,
and no other property existed). But cf. In re Greniewich's Will, 243 App. Div. 811, 278
N. Y. Supp. 279 (2d Dep't, 1935) (court held that as other property existed at time will
was made, there was no intent to revoke the trust).
2. (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 413.
3. See Larremore, Judicial Legislation in New York (,9o5) 14 YALE L. J. 312, 315;
Note (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 603, 6o6.
4. See Note (934) 39 DicK. L. REv. 37, 38. It is evident that attempts to create sim-
ilar trusts with other forms of property would be abortive. See Scott, Trusts and the Stat-
ute of Wills (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 521, 543.
5. See Leaphart, The Trust as a Substitute for a Will (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 626;
Note (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 737, for further discussion of the problems involved. The
objection that creditors of the decedent will be defrauded is met by decisions that creditors
may, when no other property exists, be satisfied out of the savings accounts. Matter of
Reich, 146 Misc. 6r6, 262 N. Y. Supp. 623 (Surr. Ct. 1933), 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. Iloi;
RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS (1935) § 58(C).
6. RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS (1935) § 58.
7. The trust may be revoked by an inconsistent will, Matter of Beagan, r12 Misc. 292,
183 N. Y. Supp. 941 (Surr. Ct. 1920) (legacies to approximate amount of deposit and no
other property) ; but it is not revoked by a residuary bequest alone, Matter of Richardson,
134 Misc. 174, 235 N. Y. Supp. 747 (Surr. Ct. 1929) ; nor does the mere reservation of the
power to revoke make the trust testamentary and subject to the revoking clause of the will,
Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925). On the effect of
the revoking clause, see Rieff's Estate, 16 Pa. Super. So, 87 (igoi). In jurisdictions refus-
ing to recognize the doctrine of tentative trusts, the attempted disposition of decedent's
money is, of course, considered purely testamentary and ineffective. Nicklas v. Parker, 69
N. J. Eq. 743, 61 Atl. 267 (1905).
i. Judge Stearne dissented on the ground that the "basic nature of a trust investment"
necessarily excluded "ownership with profits", and Judge Sinkler concurred with him but
found, in construing the will, explicit limitations on the trustee's power which would bar the
general purchase of stock.
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It is clear that if the terms of a trust instrument do not release the trustee
from the bounds of statutory legal investments, 2 he steps beyond them at his
peril.3 It is equally settled that if the trustee is given explicit power to invest in
corporate stocks, he may do so with immunity if he exercises common prudence.4
However, where, as in this case, the trustee is given in general terms a field of
discretion beyond the narrow limits of legal investments, does that field encom-
pass corporate stock or is it fenced at some traditional, real or fictitious, line of
more secure and conservative investment? Pennsylvania legislation has always
limited trust investment to loans as opposed to equities of ownership,5 but the
originally narrow list of permissible loans has been continually augmented by the
addition of new types of securities in this group, as they became sufficiently sound
in the legislature's opinion.6 However, it is equally proper for judicial opinion to
recognize economic change, and when legislative restrictions are waived in the
trust instrument, to allow the trustee to enter any field of investment which is
sound for trust purposes. The underlying question before this court was whether
sufficient economic change has occurred to warrant the admission of corporate
stocks into the trust investment field. It cannot be doubted that many corpora-
tions have gained such a secure position that their shares constitute a class of
investment stocks providing security of the original funds invested and regular-
ity of return, the two primary elements of sound trust investment.7  Moreover.
the opening of this field to the trustee results in many advantages. Diversity,
although perhaps not a legal standard of sound investing,8 is economically recog-
nized, and greater diversity is made possible by the inclusion of stocks. Also, the
trust income can undoubtedly be better co-ordinated with the purchasing power
of the dollar," and perhaps fluctuations in the value of the corpus would be
reduced by a reasonable division between equities of ownership and loans.10
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 20, § 8oi.
3. Worrell's Appeal, 9 Pa. 508 (1848) ; Commonwealth v. McConnell, 226 Pa. 244, 75
Atl. 367 (I9io).
4. Rush's Estate, 12 Pa. 375 (1849) ; Pleasants' Appeal, 77 Pa. 356 (1875) ; Appeal of
Pensyl, 2 Monaghan 361, 15 Atl. 719 (Pa. 1888).
5. See Note (936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 640, 647-649.
6. The growth of the Pennsylvania statutory legal investment field is shown by the
following statutes: 1824 P. L. 25 (obligations of the United States, Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, and the City of Philadelphia-approval of court required) ; 1854 P. L. 368 (added
ground rents and "other real estate") ; 1876 P. L. 133 (obligations of counties, cities, school
districts, and municipal corporations of Pennsylvania added-still only with approval of
court) ; 1917 P. L. 447, § 41, par. (a) 1-2 (necessity of court approval obviated for all the
above obligations plus those of Pennsylvania boroughs and townships; obligations of other
states, their cities and counties with court approval) ; 1923 P. L. 23 (obligations of Penn-
sylvania poor districts); 1923 P. L. 955 (bonds of individuals secured by mortgages on
Pennsylvania real estate); 1929 P. L. 817 (mortgage bonds of certain Pennsylvania cor-
porations and trust certificates issued by Pennsylvania trust companies); 1935 P. L. 545
(bonds of certain railroad, gas, water, electric, and telephone companies, and certain obliga-
tions guaranteed by certain government agencies).
7. Po-,aRoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1892) § IO7i.
8. See Note (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 640, 643-644.
9. While return on loans remains stationary, that on shares of stock varies to some
degree with the purchasing power of the dollar. Thus, even though returns might cease
for a period on stocks, since this would presumably occur when the purchasing power of
the dollar was relatively high, a trust corpus invested in a proper balance of stocks and
secured loans would be more likely to result in a steady real income-goods and services-
than would one limited to fixed return investments.
lO. As corporate earnings rise and dividends increase it is natural to assume that lower
income-yielding bonds will draw less favorable prices while stock prices can be expected
to rise; and conversely, as corporate earnings decrease stocks become less attractive and the
greater security of bonds should attract investors.
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Although a departure from the traditional view,11 many states have long since
recognized the propriety of the change.' 2 Since the admission of stocks appears
economically sound, and since the beneficiaries are protected from abuse of this
wider discretion by the requirement that the trustee exercise prudence and by
the close scrutiny of the courts," s it is desirable that, when legislative restrictions
are waived, the trustee be enabled to use his judgment and enter the corporate
stock field without becoming an insurer.
ii. Po ioy, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1892) § i074; see (Feb. 22, 1937) 29
TIME (No. 8) 7o n.
12. Fox v. Harris, I1 Md. 495, ii9 Atl. 256 (1922); It re Buhl's Estate, 211 Mich.
124, 178 N. W. 65, (1920) ; Smyth v. Bums, 25 Miss. 422 (1853) ; Willis v. Braucher, 79
Ohio 290, 87 N. E. 185 (I9O9) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (935) § 227.
13. In re Buhl's Estate, 211 Mich. 124, 178 N. W. 651 (1920); Hart's Estate (No. I),
203 Pa. 480, at 485-486, 53 AtI. 364, at 366 (1902).
